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This research studies the indirect financial impact of phishing announcements on firm value. 
Using about 3,000 phishing announcements, we showed that phishing has a significantly negative 
impact on firms regardless of their size. We also discovered that place of incorporation, type of 
ownership, industry, and time are significant factors exacerbating the impact. Our research 
findings may give some insights to industrial practitioners about attitude of investors towards 
phishing. Compared to other similar event studies, our research has also made several significant 
breakthroughs. Firstly, we used the largest data set ever in prior event studies. Secondly, our 
research is the first to analyze global phenomena concerning phishing. Thirdly, we enhanced the 
robustness of a regression model by introducing the criterion of selection of best fit market index 
based on R square. We believe that our research can add value to the literature in the subjects of 
phishing research and event studies. 
Keywords:  Phishing, Indirect Financial Impact, Information Security, Economics, Finance, Event 
Studies 
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Résumé 
Cette étude pionnière porte sur l'impact financier indirect subi par les entreprises suite à des annonces de 
hameçonnage ("phishing"). Une enquête basée sur près de 3000 annonces de hameçonnage dans le monde nous a 
permis de montrer que le hameçonnage a un impact négatif considérable sur les entreprises, quelle que soit leur 
taille. 
Introduction 
Phishing, which is a kind of online identity theft, has existed for about 13 years with the first AOL theft incident 
occurring in 1995 (James 2005).  Despite a short history, the increase in occurrence of these attacks has been 
tremendous. According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group, the number of phishing incidents increased 
exponentially from 8829 in December 2004 to 25328 in December 2007, with a rate of increase of 186.9% (APWG 
2005; APWG 2008). At present about 58% of corporate Internet users receive at least one phishing email daily (M2 
Presswire 2006) and it is estimated that at least 2 million people have released sensitive personal information in 
phishing incidents (Kirda and Kruegel 2005). 
Since the appearance of phishing, the techniques have evolved from plain emails purportedly coming from 
legitimate sender asking for personal information, to more sophisticated methods such as emails accompanying 
professionally made fraudulent Web sites. More recently, Pharming, which hijacks Domain Name Servers to 
redirect request from a genuine Web site to a spoof one, causes turmoil to the society (Jakobsson 2005). Making use 
of the latest technologies, techniques such as Smishing, which is a phishing attack using short message service 
(SMS), and Vishing, which is an attack using voice over IP (VoIP), have emerged (Choo et al. 2007). Online 
identity theft has also spread from the US to countries all over the world. Phishing incidents have been reported in 6 
continents although those in US remain the majority. It was estimated that in 2004 alone, the financial loss was 
US$1.2 billion (Geer 2005). 
As the financial loss is huge, many concerned companies have established various anti-phishing measures. Deutsche 
Postbank has implemented electronic signatures to facilitate authentication of legitimate company emails (Libbenga 
2006). Bank of America has launched SiteKey to add a second layer of authentication to better protect customers 
against identity theft (Nowell 2005). Governments worldwide have passed laws or ordinances to safeguard  the 
general public, for instance, Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of US and Data Protection Directive of 
European Union (Bose and Leung 2007). With strong advocacy of anti-phishing from both industries and 
governments, the awareness of customers towards phishing has been heightened. 
However, with the increasing number of phishing incidents, customers’ confidence over electronic commerce has 
faded. In a consumer study conducted by Cyota, it was found that among 650 bank account holders, 75% 
relinquished the habit of online shopping due to the threat of phishing (Cardline 2004). Also, this anxiety has 
reduced the rate of opening legitimate email by 20 to 30% as reflected in a study of MarketingSherpa (Brandt 2005). 
Obviously, the indirect cost of e-commerce companies due to phishing is enormous. Currently, the estimated 
financial loss due to phishing is based on consumer surveys and the expected loss of revenue generated by e-
commerce companies as a result of phishing. The variability of the surveys may be too subjective to give an accurate 
estimation. With a motivation towards quantifying the amount of indirect cost, we instigated this research with hope 
to give more concrete evidence that phishing hurts global e-commerce markets. Using an event study methodology, 
which is a robust method proven in many business disciplines, we intend to enumerate the indirect financial loss of 
market value due to phishing and arouse the awareness of industrial practitioners towards the better protection of 
customers against such online identity theft. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we discuss relevant research studies in the fields 
of phishing research and information security. We identify the limitations of current research and show how our 
research can bridge the gap. In the third and fourth sections, we outline our research hypotheses and methodology. 
We show how we derive our research hypotheses and develop a more robust step in development of a regression 
model in our research methodology, which may contribute to existing literature in the field of event study. Finally, 
the implication of our research is drawn and interesting phenomena are discussed. 
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Literature Review 
Although phishing has been around for 13 years, research in this area is limited and mainly focused on technical 
research and phenomenological study. The former refers to technical innovations to safeguard customers against 
phishing attacks, for instance, Dynamic Security Skin (Dhamija and Tygar 2005), Web Wallet (Wu et al. 2006), 
Trust Bar (Herzberg and Gbara 2004), and Anti-Phish (Kirda and Kruegel 2005). The latter diagnoses the critical 
success factors of phishing attacks. The identified factors include social engineering skills, lack of knowledge, visual 
deception, and lack of attentiveness to detail (Dhamija and Tygar 2005; Jagatic et al. 2006). To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no other research study analyzing economic impacts of phishing. Our knowledge of economic 
loss is only based on actual financial loss in certain reported phishing incidents and estimation based on consumer 
surveys. However, those figures may not be an accurate reflection of reality. The estimated US$ 1 million financial 
loss due to phishing may be just one tenth of the real problem (Goth 2005). Some indirect financial loss, for 
instance, loss of future revenue due to lack of confidence of customers and damage of company brand, has not been 
considered. It is expected that indirect financial loss may be even more than the reported financial loss. This 
motivated us to conduct a more thorough analysis to investigate the economic impact of phishing on firm value. 
In the field of information security, though not directly related to phishing, several research studies have been 
conducted on the economic impact of other security threats on firm value. Event study methodology, which has been 
proven to be a robust methodology in various disciplines from accounting and finance to management information 
systems, has been widely adopted. The summary of main findings of relevant literatures is as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Literature Review of Information Security Related Event Studies 
Area of Study Time Period Number of Events CAR 
Impact of personal information security 
breaches on firm value (Campbell et al. 2003) 
1995-2000 43 -5.5% * 
Impact of information security breaches on 
firm value (Kannan et al. 2007) 
1997-2003 72 -3.2% * 
Impact of internet security breaches on firm 
value (Cavusoglu et al. 2004) 
1998-2000 66 -2.1% * 
Impact of denial of service attacks on firm 
value (Hovav and D'Arcy 2003) 
1998-2002 23 [-90.3% , 
62.1%] 
Impact of software vulnerabilities on firm 
value (Telang and Wattal 2007) 
1999-2004 147 -0.6% * 
Impact of data breaches on firm value 
(Acquisti et al. 2006) 
2000-2005 79 -0.6% * 
Impact of SPAM on penny stocks (Bohme 
and Holz 2006) 
2004-2006 152 +1.7% * 
 *Significant at the 10% or less confidence level 
 
The result of prior studies on information security shows that security threats in general have a negative impact on 
market value of target companies, especially, leakage of privacy data and breaches of information security. This may 
indicate that phishing, a type of security threat, may also pose a negative impact on market price. Nevertheless, the 
amount of financial loss due to phishing may not be accurately estimated in prior studies. A thorough analysis is 
necessary to obtain the answer. Also, one of the limitations of prior studies is that the subjects of the research are all 
US companies. As regional factors may dominate the research results, the universal phenomenon cannot be 
accurately determined on the basis of regional data.  
Furthermore, the sample size of the research is not large enough in some prior studies. In the study of denial of 
service attack, insignificant results were obtained due to small sample size. Also, some research studies adopted a 
scope too wide for pinpointing a specific type of security threat. In study on breaches of information security, the 
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scope covered everything from data leakage to service availability. The impact could not adequately explain the 
influence of each individual information security breach on stock price. Moreover, in some research studies on 
thinly traded stocks, stocks that were listed on Pink Sheet and OTC were used. The robustness of the research 
studies is questionable as such stocks are extremely volatile. Nevertheless, prior research in the area of information 
security adds strong motivation towards conducting our research and foreshadows some of our research results.  
In this research study, we bridged the literature gaps of both phishing research and information security. Our study is 
the first study on the economic impact of phishing on market value. The result can help quantify indirect financial 
loss due to identity theft. Secondly, our research data included worldwide phishing announcements and thus we 
were able to minimize the regional factors and more accurately suggest the extent of universal phenomena within 
this subject. Thirdly, our research sample size was the largest of all event studies in the field of management 
information systems. Therefore, our research should give rise to more robust findings. Also, we strictly followed the 
conventional event study methodology and eliminated any thinly traded stocks. Furthermore we refined the event 
study methodology by including the selection of the available best regression model.  This enhanced the reliability 
of our research findings. 
Research Hypotheses 
The motive of this research is to analyze the overall impact of phishing announcements on the market value of e-
commerce companies. The research hypotheses are outlined in this section.  
Phishing poses a threat to both e-commerce companies and their customers. Not only does it cause direct financial 
impact to the customers, but also hurts the brand image of the target companies because the occurrence of phishing 
implicitly reveals that the anti-phishing strategies are not adequate enough to deter the crime and thus causes 
financial loss to customers. Such attacks may shatter the confidence of customers in using the service provided by 
the companies. As a result, it is expected that future revenue of the firm may be lowered. From a rational investor’s 
perspective, if other factors remain unchanged, it is better to sell the stocks of phishing targeted companies because 
the appearance of phishing announcements may expose the weaknesses of corporate information security and 
foreshadow poor performance in retaining existing customers. Therefore, it is expected that negative impacts on the 
market value of companies may emerge. Hypothesis 1 is conceived below. This conforms to the earlier studies on 
information security that phishing, which is a type of security threat, may pose a negative impact on market value. 
H1: Phishing announcements have a negative impact on firm value regardless of firm size 
The negative impact of phishing on market value may rely on the perception of investors, who associate phishing 
attacks with weak information security. Therefore, people who are more knowledgeable about phishing may have a 
stronger perception concerning the matter. It is conjectured that developed countries, where people are more 
accustomed to electronic services, may have stronger perceptions about the association and thus penalize the 
companies being targeted more severely. Hypothesis 2 is developed below. 
H2: Companies listed in developed countries are more negatively affected by phishing announcements 
According to APWG, phishing usually targets firms in financial and banking industries because these industries are 
the most lucrative. In January 2008, the most frequently targeted industry sectors for phishing were financial 
services (92.4%) followed by ISP (1.5%), Government and miscellaneous (2.3%), and retail (1.5%) (APWG 2008). 
Therefore, customers from the financial services sector should be most concerned about phishing. They are more 
likely to switch to another company when one fails to deter phishing. Thus, investors may penalize companies in 
that sector more severely when phishing occurs. Hypothesis 3 is conjectured below. 
H3: Financial and banking industries are severely affected by phishing announcements 
In this research, we focused on the stock price of listed companies only. Some phishing attacks may directly target 
holding companies, which are traded directly in the stock market, for instance, HSBC and Citigroup, while some 
may target subsidiaries, for instance, West Bank and Smith Barney, whose parents companies are listed rather than 
themselves. We believe phishing targeting holding companies has a more negative impact on firm value when 
compared with phishing targeting subsidiary companies because investors may judge the performance of all 
subsidiaries of a holding company as a whole when making investment decisions. The specific hypothesis is shown 
below.  
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H4: Phishing announcements relating to holding companies have a more negative impact than those related to 
subsidiary companies whose parents are listed 
As technology progresses, more and more sophisticated phishing attacks occur. In the past, the most rudimentary 
phishing attack only used plain text emails purportedly coming from the genuine service providers to ask users to 
reply with their personal information. Now, phishing email is usually accompanied a hyperlink leading to a bogus 
Web site, which looks seemingly genuine.  In some more recent attacks, apart from a bogus Web site, the 
adversaries also make use of malware such as keyloggers, viruses, and Trojans to enhance the rate of success 
(Lininger and Vines 2005). When a customer goes to a phishing Web site or receives a phishing email, the malware 
may be automatically downloaded to the victims’ personal computer. The more sophisticated the phishing attack, the 
higher is the success rate. In view of this, we conjecture hypothesis 5 as below. 
H5: The more sophisticated the phishing attack, the more negative the impact on firm value 
As discussed above, the negative impact of phishing relies on the perception of investors. This may require investors 
to have adequate knowledge and awareness of phishing attacks. As time passes, perceptions of people may change 
with more knowledge about phishing. We believe in the past, when people had little knowledge of phishing, the 
impact of phishing announcements on firm value was not as high as more recently when many companies, 
information security organizations, and government bureaus have taken the initiative to educate customers on 
phishing. With the wide coverage by the press and government, the awareness about phishing for the general public 
may have increased. Therefore, we have developed H6.  
H6: Impact of phishing increases over time 
Research Methodology 
In this research, we followed the widely adopted event study methodology and used the methodology of Dos Santos 
et al. (Dos Santos et al. 1993) as the main framework because that is the first event study in the stream of 
management information systems and many event studies in the same field have also followed their methodology. 
However, we have made some adjustments to the methodology by including criteria such as a larger time window 
for filtering confounding announcements and selection of appropriate trading stocks. Furthermore, in order to 
enhance the reliability of this research, we also developed a new step to determine the best fit regression model. In 
this section, a detailed description of the research methodology is provided. 
Initially, we gathered phishing announcements which occurred before 2008 from publicly available security alert 
databases, phishing alert databases, and ordinary news databases. Repositories from organizations, such as 
Millersmiles, Websense, Antiphishing Working Group Japan (APWG JP), Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
(HKMA), Malaysia Computer Emergent Response Team (MyCERT), and Factiva were used. Sharing the same 
database with APWG, Millersmiles is one of the strategic partners of APWG. Its phishing repository was the largest 
in the world at the time of research and its daily phishing alerts are frequently subscribed by the general public and 
commercial companies. Apart from screenshots of phishing emails and fraudulent Web sites, most phishing 
announcements also included a risk level according to the technical sophistication of the attack. However, one 
limitation of the repository was that it included a lot of US and UK announcements with few related to companies in 
other countries. In order to expand our scope of analysis, we included other data repositories. Websense is a 
commercial company specialized in Web filtering software. It publishes phishing announcements with a wider 
coverage in Europe and Asia.  The phishing announcement repositories of Millersmiles and Websense were the 
main sources of phishing announcements for this research. In order to further expand our data sources, especially 
data from Asia, we also used other repositories such as those from APWG JP, HKMA, and MyCERT. Apart from 
this, we also gathered phishing announcements from official Web pages of some companies, which have a section 
devoted to security or phishing alerts. Besides data collected from various data repositories, we followed the 
conventional event study methodology to look for other missing phishing announcements from news repository of 
Factiva. Factiva has a wide coverage of news throughout the world. We used keywords such as “phishing”, 
“spoof/fraudulent emails”, “spoof/fraudulent Websites”, etc, to exhaustively search all relevant Factiva news that 
occurred before 2008. 
Secondly, we retrieved useful data from phishing announcements by identifying the target companies as well as 
specific event dates. All companies, which were not listed or whose parents were not listed at the time phishing 
occurred or did not have at least 200-trading day data one month prior to phishing announcements, were removed. 
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Next, for those listed companies, which were too thinly traded, for instance, those listed in PINK and OTC, were all 
removed because thinly traded stocks may influence the parametric test of subsequent analysis (Chatterjee et al. 
2002). Then we filtered announcements, which may confound with other important events such as merger and 
acquisition, hiring/leaving of senior management, declaration of dividends, and earning announcements. We adopted 
a 5 day window (2 days before the event, event day, and 2 days after the event) to filter out announcements with 
confounding events. Next, we retrieved daily trading data for the companies from the day it started to trade to the 
date of the event from Reuters. However, some companies were delisted at the time of the research and thus we 
were unable to retrieve the data and those announcements were deleted. Table 2 shows the sample size of all 
announcements retrieved before and after filtering. 
 
Table 2. Sample Data 
Source Before Filtering After Filtering 
Millersmiles 7407 2668 
Websense 582 181 
APWG JP 32 17 
HKMA 113 34 
MyCERT 24 9 
Factiva 1207 78 
Others 30 7 
Total 9395 2994 
 
We categorized tickers of companies according to their listed stock exchanges. Then for each stock exchange, we 
retrieved major general market composite indices and market composite indices for banking and financial industries 
because the majority of the sample was from the two industries. Then we followed the conventional methodology to 
run a regression for each company ticker and its associated market composite indices using 200 historical trading 
data one month before the phishing announcement date as shown in Table 3 and Figure 1. 
 
Table 3. Market Indices of Different Stock Exchanges 
Origin of Stock 
Exchange 
Market Indices Sample Size 
Australia S&P/ASX 300 Banks, S&P/ASX 300 Diversified Financials, S&P/ASX 
Financials, and ASX All Ordinaries Index 75 
Austria ATX Austrian Traded Index 1 
Belgium BEL 20 Index, BEL General Financial Financial Index, and BEL Banks 
Financial Index 1 
Brazil Sao Paulo SE Bovespa Index 2 
Canada Toronto SE 300 Composite Index and S&P/TSE Canadian Financials 
Sector Index 50 
Colombia Colombia SE General Index 1 
Cyprus Cyprus Stock Exchange / FTSE Top 20 Index, Main Market Index, CSE 
General Index, and Banks Index 1 
France CAC Banks Financial Index, CAC Financials Financial Index, and CAC 
40 Index 25 
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Germany PRIME Xetra Bank Index, PRIME Xetra Financial Sevices Index, HDAX 
Index, DAX Index 4 
Greece Athens Stock Exchange FTSE Financial Services Index, Athens Stock 
Exchange FTSE Banks Index, ASE Main General Index 3 
Hong Kong Hang Seng Finance Index and Hang Seng Index 28 
India Bombay SE Sensitive Index and Bombay SE 100 Index 7 
Ireland ISEQ Overall Index and ISEQ Financial Index 8 
Italy MIBTEL General Index, Milan SE Bank Historical Index, and Milan SE 
Financial Services Historical Index 7 
Japan Nikkei 225 Index, Topix 100 Market Index, Topix 500 Market Index, and 
TOPIX Stock Price Index 20 
Kuwait Gih Gcc Ilsmc Index 2 
Malaysia KLSE Financial Index and KLSE Composite Index 17 
Mexico INMEX Index and IPC Index 3 
Netherlands Amsterdam Exchanges Index, AEX Banks Index, and AEX Financial 
Index 15 
Philippines Philippine SE Composite Index and Philippine SE Financial Index 2 
Qatar Doha Securities Market General Index 1 
Romania Bucharest SE Composite Index and Bucharest SE BET Index 2 
Singapore Straits Times Index 9 
South Africa Johannesburg Stock Exchange All Share Industrials Index and Financials 
Index 2 
South Korea Korea SE Kospi 200 Index and Korea SE KOSPI Finance Index 1 
Spain IBEX 35 Index 28 
Sweden Stockholm Options Marknad OMX Value Index and SWX SP Banks 
Total Return Index 2 
Switzerland Swiss Market Index 4 
Taiwan Taiwan SE Weighted Index and Taiwan SE Banking & Insurance Index 1 
Turkey Istanbul SE Ulusal 100 Index 1 
United Arab 
Emirates 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi Emirates Stock Market Index, Banking 
Index, National Bank of Abu Dhabi Banking Sector Index, National Bank 
of Abu Dhabi Banking Index, and ABN Amro Dubai Total Return Index 4 
United Kingdom FTSE 100 Index and FTSE All Share Banks Index 548 
United States AMEX Composite Index, AMEX Financial Index, S&P 500, S&P Banks 
Industry Group Index, S&P Diversified Banks Index, NASDAQ 
Financial 100 Index, NASDAQ Bank Index, NASDAQ 100 Index, and 
NASDAQ Composite Index 2118 
Venezuela Bursatil Index 1 
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Figure 1.  Time Frame of Event Study 
 
In order to yield a more robust regression result, for a stock exchange with more than one composite index, we 
selected the composite index, which gave a higher R square in regression. This is a new step, which was not 
implemented in prior event study researches, but we believe this step can enhance the robustness and reliability of 
the research study because a regression model with a higher R square gives a better prediction and thus a more 
accurate result in computing the abnormal returns in subsequent steps. 
Fourthly, we followed the conventional steps of event study methodology to compute the abnormal returns of stock 
price of each ticker using capital pricing model, )( mttitit RRAR βα +−=  for each event i on day t for market 
index m. α and β are intercept and slope obtained from the regression model. Then we used ARit to calculate 
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Research Results 
The overall impact of phishing announcement is as shown in Table 4. It is shown that phishing announcements had a 
negative impact on firm value with a loss of 5.1% in CSAR significant at 99% confidence level. Considering the 
impact on firms with different size, where large firms have annual revenue greater than the mean of US$ 9,633 
million, we found that with an average loss of 6.1% the impact for large firms was higher than that for small firms 
with an average loss of 4.5%. Therefore, H1 is strongly supported. 
 
Table 4. Overall Research Result 
 N CSAR Z 
Overall 2994 -5.1% -2.79** 
Large firms 1067 -6.1% -1.99* 
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Small firms 1918 -4.5% -1.96* 
  ** Significant at 99% confidence level 
  * Significant at 95% confidence level 
 
When we took origin of companies into consideration, developed countries showed a negative CSAR at -5.3% at 
99% confidence level whereas the CSAR for developing countries were non-significant as shown in Table 5. 
Therefore, H2 is strongly supported. 
 
Table 5. Research Result by Development Status 
Type Countries/Regions N CSAR Z 
Developed 
Countries 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, and United 
States 
2946 -5.3% -2.89** 
Developing 
Countries 
Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, South Africa, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela 
48 8.0% 0.55 
** Significant at 99% confidence level 
 
With regard to industries, we grouped various phishing announcements according to Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) as defined by Reuters. As some GICS are similar in nature, we further clustered them into 5 
different industries, namely, banking, finance, insurance, IT & Telecom, and Others. As shown in Table 6, industries 
such as finance and IT & Telecom showed the most negative impact, at 99% confidence level. However, contrary to 
our initial anticipation, the banking industry did not pose a highly significantly negative impact. Therefore H3 is 
only partially supported. 
 
Table 6. Research Result by Industries 
Industries GICS N CSAR Z 
Banking Asset Management & Custody Banks, Diversified 
Banks, Investment Banking & Brokerage, and 
Regional Banks 
1443 -2.6% -1.00 
Finance Consumer Finance, Diversified Capital Markets, Other 
Diversified Financial Services, Specialized Finance, 
and Thrifts and Mortgage Finance 
448 -10.6% -2.25** 
Insurance Life & Health Insurance,  Multi-line Insurance, and 
Property & Casualty Insurance 
145 3.8% 0.46 
IT & Telecom Application Software, Communications Equipment, 
Data Processing & Outsourced Services,  Integrated 
Telecommunication Services,  Internet Software & 
Services, Systems Software, Wireless 
Telecommunication Services 
839 -8.3% -2.39** 
Others Broadcasting & Cable TV, Casinos & Gaming, Food 
Retail, Human Resource & Employment Services, 
Hypermarkets and Supercenters, Internet Retail, 
Movies & Entertainment,  Publishing, and Railroads 
119 -3.1% -0.34 
IS Security and Privacy 
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** Significant at 99% confidence level 
With regard to the analysis of target companies of phishing with different types of ownership, the impact of holding 
companies was significantly negative whereas that of subsidiaries was not. Therefore, H4 is supported. The detail is 
as shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Research Result by Company Ownership 
 N CSAR Z 
Overall 2994 -5.1% -2.79** 
Holding Companies 1306 -7.3% -2.65** 
Subsidiaries 1688 -3.4% -1.39 
** Significant at 99% confidence level 
 
Considering various methods of phishing attacks, we analyzed only those data retrieved from the repository of 
Millersmiles because it classified each phishing announcement into 6 risk levels according to their technical 
sophistication. Table 8 shows the definition of each risk level. 
 
Table 8. Risk Levels of Phishing Announcements 
Risk Level Definition 
N/A No risk assessment has been done 
Low Little chance to fool others or none of the hyperlinks 
provided by the phishing scams are valid 
Low-Medium Little chance to fool others because of poor features such 
as broken hyperlinks or invalid URL 
Medium Well constructed phishing scam despite bad grammar and 
spelling 
Medium-High Professionally made phishing scam with possibly more 
dangerous features 
High Phishing scam accompanied with virus or other new and 
rare techniques 
 
The impact of phishing announcement based on technical sophistication is shown in Table 9. As the sample size of 
low and low-medium was small, we grouped them into a new category called “< Medium”. Among all risk factors, 
phishing with medium risk showed the most significant result. However, the CSAR associated with high risks was 
not significant at all. Therefore, H5 does not hold. 
 
Table 9. Research Result by Risk Factors 
Risk N CSAR Z 
< Medium 29 -6.8% -0.36 
Medium 2260 -4.8% -2.29 ** 
Medium-High 221 -3.3% -0.48 
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High 69 -5.1% -0.42 

















Figure 2.  Change of CSAR over Time 
 
 
Table 10. Research Result by Risk Factors 
Year N CSAR Z 
2003 53 15.7% 1.14 
2004 359 -1.7% -0.33 
2005 745 -0.7% -0.20 
2006 921 -12.4% -3.78 ** 
2007 916 -3.8% -1.16 
** Significant at 99% confidence level 
 
As shown in Figure 2, a downward trend is indicated when we compared CSAR over the year of announcements. In 
the very beginning, a phishing announcement did not pose a negative impact to firm value at all. This may indirectly 
reflect that people in general did not have adequate knowledge about phishing. However, from 2004 onwards, the 
negative impact was aggravated and in 2006, the CSAR became the most negative and reached the bottom. As 
shown in Table 10, the CSAR in 2006 was significant at a 99% confidence level. This shows that people are more 
concerned about phishing and perceive phishing announcements to be a reflection of the weakness of the company. 
However, in 2007, the CSAR bounced back and became less negative. This may be due to change in perception of 
investors. The influx of phishing announcements may give investors an impression that phishing is a random attack 
and may not necessarily be related to the weakness of the company. Therefore, a bounce-back occurred. Hypothesis 
H6 is not supported. 
Discussion 
Some interesting phenomena were discovered in this research. First and foremost, our research gave strong evidence 
to show that phishing announcements drive down the market value of companies providing e-commerce services. 
Such a phenomenon exists in both large and small companies although the impact on holding companies was more 
significant than subsidiaries. It is also shown that the market in general favors companies with adequate information 
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security measures to protect their customers, and penalizes those firms that do not do so. This gives a strong signal 
to industrial practitioners to better equip themselves to deter phishing. 
Secondly, our findings showed that the impact of phishing was more significant in developed countries when 
compared with other parts of the world. This might be associated with varied knowledge or exposure to phishing of 
general public in different countries. As the impact of phishing announcements was highly dependent on the 
knowledge of investors towards the identity theft, it might be due to this reason the announcements related to 
developing countries did not yield a significant result. 
Thirdly, it was found that the most targeted industries of phishing, such as banking and finance, were not necessarily 
the most severely affected by phishing announcements. From our research analysis, among the two industries, only 
companies from the financial industry had the most significantly negative impact although companies from the 
banking industries also showed a relatively high negative return. The frequent appearance of phishing 
announcements from the banking industries might dilute the perception that being attacked by phishing is equivalent 
to poor performance in information security. As a result, the banking industry had a lower impact than the finance 
industry. Nevertheless, apart from the finance industry, IT and Telecom was another significantly affected industry. 
The high impact might be due to higher expectation of people in general that companies from the IT and Telecom 
industry should have better expertise and technologies to deter phishing. Therefore, when they were targeted by 
phishing, investors perceived that such companies were inferior to their peers and thus penalized them more 
severely. 
Furthermore, our research results suggested that people in general did not penalize phishing attacks with higher 
technical sophistication. This again might be related to the knowledge of investors to phishing. People in general 
might treat all types of phishing attacks equally and thus announcements associated with high risks did not show the 
most significantly negative impact. 
Finally, our research indicated a change in perception of phishing over time. As shown in Figure 2, the CSAR 
showed a downward trend from 2003 to 2006. This corresponded to the increasing number of phishing incidents 
throughout the period. As shown by APWG, the year to year rates of reported phishing incidents were 2.7%, 56.0%, 
and 8.0% from 2004-2005, 2005-2006, and 2006-2007 respectively (APWG 2005; APWG 2006; APWG 2008). 
From 2005-2006, a sharp increase was observed. With the surge in phishing attacks and wider coverage by the press, 
people understood the phenomenon of phishing more and thus had a stronger perception that being attacked by 
phishing is associated with poor corporate information security. However, in 2007, a decrease in the impact of 
phishing was observed. This again might be related to changes in perception. As more and more phishing incidents 
occurred, people might have become de-sensitized about such news and thus did not penalize companies for being 
the target of phishing so seriously. In order to justify such a change of perception, we need more time and data to 
implement a longitudinal study. Such an analysis could be the subject of future research. 
Conclusion 
This is a pioneering event study in the area of phishing. We have successfully shown that there exists an indirect link 
between phishing announcements and firm value.  We made a significant improvement when compared with other 
similar studies in the area of information security using the event study methodology in terms of sample size and 
selection of the best fit regression model. By careful analysis of phishing announcements, we discovered that 
phishing had a significantly negative impact on firm value regardless of firm size. However, the origin of phishing 
might differ from one place to another. The impact on companies listed in developed countries was more negative 
than those listed in developing countries. This might be related to the frequent occurrence of phishing incidents and 
also the richer knowledge of investors towards phishing. However, if the target company was a holding corporation, 
the impact was more severe and statistically significant when compared with the subsidiaries. Also, our results 
seemed to suggest that the technical skills of phishing did not have much of a relationship with the impacts of 
phishing. However, time factors might influence the results. This might be related to the change in the perception of 
people towards phishing announcements over time. At the very beginning, the impact of phishing announcements 
was very little due to the inadequate exposure or knowledge about phishing.  But the impact became more and more 
negative with the passage of time and in 2006, the highest negative impact was observed. However, it became less 
strong in 2007. The mitigation of the effect might be related to influx of too much phishing information and people 
becoming less inclined to penalize firms which failed to deter phishing. Nevertheless, as one of the future research 
areas, we will collect more data to conduct a longitudinal study to analyze the change in investors’ perception to 
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phishing over time. By quantifying the indirect financial loss of phishing, we hope that our research can urge 
industrial practitioners to pay more attention to the negative impacts of phishing attacks and adopt more adequate 
anti-phishing measures to safeguard their customers and deter phishing. Furthermore, we believe that our research 
can contribute to academia by bridging the research gap in both phishing research and event studies.   
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